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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
North Dakota in view of the impending coal development, and its
accompanying electrical generating plants, gasification plants with
all of the possibilities of damage to the environment similar to the
pollution of Lake Champlain in Zahn.
At this point, the primary method of repairing the damage done
to class actions with the Snyder and Zahn decisions is by Congres-
sional action to amend the amount in controversy clause to allow
aggregation to meet the requirement or to allow ancillary jurisdic-
tion over the unnamed class members or to amend the jurisdictional
statute to give private citizens standing to sue for environmental
degradation.l It may also be possible to bring two suits, one for
injunctive relief under existing federal law, and another for damages,
arguing that the suit for damages is ancillary to the suit for injunc-
tive ielief.6 2 But, it is clear that some mechanism should be found
to bring environmental class actions within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, to allow people who have been injured by environ-
mental degradation to receive compensation.
JON BEUSEN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-ATTORNEYS' FEES-FEES AWARDED UNDER
EQUITY TO ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST LITIGANTS FOR PROMOTING
SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTERESTS.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. and Friends of the Earth
instituted an action against R. C. Morton, Secretary of the Interior,
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
to bar construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline. The controversy
focused on whether the Secretary of the Interior had authority to
grant special land use permits for pipeline rights-of-way in excess
of statutory width specifications1 and whether he had prepared
61. Bills such as this have been introduced. In the second session of the 92d Congress
(1972), S. 1032 and 11. 1049 both provided citizens with standing to bring suit for injunc-
tive or declaratory relief for environmental degradation regardless of the amount in contro-
versy.
62. This approach was successful in Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 309 F. Supp.
S54 (N.D. Ohio 1969). The action was brought in state court and removed. Jurisdiction
over the suit for injunctive relief was obtained by the Court, saying: "It appears to the
Court that the right of each member of the class to live in an environment free from
excessive coal dust and conversely, the right of the defendant to operate its coal loading
facility are both in excess of $10,000.00." Id. at 855. The court then assumed, jurisdiction
over the suit for damages as ancillary to the suit for injunctive relief.
For a discussion of the basis for jurisdiction over suits for injunctive relief, see,
Note, The Federal Class Action in Environmental Litigation: Problems and Possibilities,
51 N.C.L. REv. 1385, 1401 (1973).
1. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 § 28, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), provides that "Rights-
of-way through public lands . . . may be granted . . . to the extent of the ground occu-
pied by the said pipe line and twenty-five feet on each side of the same..."
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an adequate environmental impact statement.2 A preliminary in-
junction was granted to arrest the violation.8 Three years later
this decision to enforce the statutory technicality was upheld in
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals.4 Having prevailed, the
appellants requested an award of expenses and attorneys' fees.5
The Court of Appeals applied the equitable "private attorney gener-
al" exception to the traditional American rule,6 a rule which bars
recovery of attorneys' fees7 unless there is express statutory authori-
zation. The Court then remanded the bill of costs to the District
Court for an assessment against the defendant, Alyeska Pipeline
Service Company," of one half the amount of the reasonable
services rendered by the appellants' attorneys. The appellants, how-
ever, were forced to assume the other half since the court found
that the United States cannot be taxed for fees, unless specifically
2. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-47 (1970) [here-
inafter referred to as NEPAl provides that the Secretary of the Interior must submit to
the Congress an environmental impact statement outlining in detail the consequences of an
approved project.
3. Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
4. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 93 S. Ct.
1550 (1973). See generally Dominick & Brady, The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness Society v.
Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AMEn. U.L. REv. 337 (1973).
In this complete outline of the factors surrounding the development of the Alaskan oil
fields and problems of transportation between Prudhoe Bay and the lower forty eight states,
the authors explain how the effect of the original decision was a "remand" to Congress of
the issues involved. When appellants initiated the action for a violation of the width re-
strictions in the Mineral Leasing Act, the Interior Department, though willing to grant the
violative rights-of-way, had not drafted an Impact statement for the pipeline as required
by NEPA. Thus Congress was forced to revise the Mineral Leasing Act rather than per-
mitting its continued evasion. Congress therefore amended the Mineral Leasing Act of 1970,
to permit construction. 87 Stat. 576. In a further amendment sponsored by Senator Gravel
of Alaska, Congress provided that the actions already taken by the Department of the In-
terior were a sufficient compliance with NEPA. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act,
43 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (c,d). As a result of this action by Congress, the appellants moved for
a dismissal of the entire litigation on January 16, 1974.
5. A bill of costs was also submitted by the Cordova District Fisheries Union, an ap-
pellant from previous litigation. Since it was not a prevailing party on any issue in its
separate suit, Cordova was not entitled to costs. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d
1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
6. Traditionally in the United States the rule has been that attorney's fees are not
assessable against the losing party, either in the form of costs or as a part of the dam-
ages awarded to the prevailing party. Rather each party generally has been left to bear
for himself the cost of counsel. E.g., Hall v. Cole, 93 S. Ct. 1943, 1945-46 (1973) ; Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
For a thorough historical resume on the general American rule, its operational charac-
teristics, and a comparison with its equitable exceptions see Note, Attorney's Fees: Where
Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216, 1216-33 (1967).
7. See Clay v. Overseas Carriers Corp., 61 F.R.D. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Fees are the
charges a party to an action must pay to his own attorney for services rendered In the
course of the case. Costs are the additional expenses of litigation which are usually awarded
by statute to the prevailing party and taxed against the losing party. rd. at 336.
8. Although the Department of the Interior was responsible for the actual violations of
the Mineral Leasing Act and NEPA, it was the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company that per-
suaded the government to grant the rights-of-way and who later intervened in th litiga-
tion to protect its Interests. Thus J. Skelly Wright, writing for the majority, described
Alyeska as, "a major and real party at Interest In this case, actively participating in the
litigation along with the Government ..... In recognition of the Government's role in the
case, on the other hand, Alyeska should have to bear only half of the total fees. . . . In
this manner the equitable principle that appellees bear their fair share of this litigation's
full cost and the congressional policy that the United States not be taxable for fees can be
accommodated." Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The state of Alaska, also, Joined as a defendant with Alyeska and the United States.
The court ruled, however, that it was not liable for plaintiff's fees under the private attor-
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ordered under a statutory award of costs.9 Wilderness Society v.
Morton, 405 F.2d 1026 (1974).
The practice in English courts has always been to grant the
witness the expense of his counsel fees, whereas in American courts
such awards have been made only in rare circumstances." The
novelty of this difference is accented by the fact that almost all
American practices have evolved from the English example. There
are several possible reasons for the development of this anomalous
American rule including a public mistrust of lawyers,"' the Amer-
ican belief that every man should pay his own way as well as
the expenses for defending himself,"' and the possibility of historical
accident.'3
Accordingly, proponents of the American no-fee rule have argued
that the practice encourages litigation by eliminating the threat
to adversaries of their opponents' attorney fees. 4 Further, that coun-
sel fees are too varied to be accurately ascertained and would
very likely become excessive.' 5 And finally, that in the growing
area of environmental litigation, general fee shifting might flood
the courts with environmental cases.' 6 Within the last decade these
arguments have been strongly criticized 7 by an increasing number of
advocates of the English rule.'
A changing attitude is reflected by the substantial increase in
the application of recognized departures from the no-fee rule. These
exceptions may be divided into two general categories-those created
by statute and those resulting from an exercise of the courts' inherent
power of equity.
ney general theory because it had participated voluntarily in an effort to present to the
Court a different version of the public interest ramifications of the pipeline. Refer to text
accompanying note 57, infra, on sovereign immunity.
9. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 405 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
10. Costs were not awarded to litigants in the absence of statute under early common
law, but the Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 67 Vict., c. 66; and the Judicature Act of 1875,
38 & 39 made costs available to the winning party, as a matter of course in both equity
and law, unless the court determined that the conditions surrounding the case required a
deviation from the rule. See Plater & King, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest-
Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. REV. 27, 31-32 (1973) ; Goodhart, Costs, 34 YALE L.J.
849, 854 (1929).
11. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALiF. L. Rzv.
792, 798 (1966).
12. Goodhart, supra note 9, at 873. For a recent and comprehensive treatment of the
entire area of attorneys' fees see Plater & King, The Right to Counse, Fees in Publid In-
terest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. Rlv. 27 (1973).
13. Note, supra note 5, at 1220-21.
14. These speculations are discussed and criticized In Ehrenzweig, supra note 10, at 797.
15. The idea of remoteness in attorneys fees was discussed and rejected in McCormick,
Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN.
L. Rxv. 619, 639-41 (1931) ; See generally Note, supra note 5.
16. Empirical studies have shown otherwise. See, e.g., Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1004 (1974).
17. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 10; Note Attorney's Fees as an Element of
Damages, 15 U. CIN. L. REv. 313 (1941) ; Skoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A
Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 202 (1966) ; Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why
Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IOwA L. REv. 75 (1963) ; 65 MICH. L. REv. 593 (1967) ; Mc-
Cormick, supra note 14; Note, supra note 5; Goodhart, supra note 9.
18. See Plater & King, supra note 11, at 35-37.
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Statutory exceptions follow two basic patterns: those requiring
an automatic or mandatory transfer of fees, 9 and those giving
the courts discretion to grant fees to the prevailing party.20
However, the federal judiciary has created the most outstanding
exceptions to the American rule by exercising its general powers
of equity. The Supreme Court stated that use of these exceptions
is permissible whenever "overriding considerations of justice seem
to compel such a result."'1  Departures from the no-fee rule have
been classified as the "obdurate behavior," "common fund," and
"private attorney general" exceptions. 22
The obdurate behavior theory has been used primarily to protect
the honest litigant and discourage abuse of the court system. Fees
are awarded to a litigant when his opponent has pursued an uncon-
scionable, bad faith, or vexatious action or defense.
23
The common fund approach is based upon the desire to prevent
the unjust enrichment of others who stand to benefit from a deci-
sion. The doctrine is applied when a person's successful litigation
confers a substantial benefit on the property interests or legal rights
of the members of an ascertainable class and when the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter makes possible an award of
fees that will operate to spread that person's costs proportionately
among the class members.
2 4
19. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3b (1970) Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) ; Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) Truth in Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970); Housing and Rent Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1895(a), (b) (1970);
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 908(b) (1970) ; Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678
(1970). For a general discussion of the statutory exceptions to the no fee rule see 6 J.
MOORX, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.71[2] at 1378-85 (1972). See Plater & King, supra
note 11, at 38 & n.56.
20. E.g., Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(e)
(1970) ; Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970) Serviceman's Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C.
§ 1822(b) (1970).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also allow an award of counsel fees in certain
instances. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3), 90(d), 33(a), 36(a), S7(a)(4) and 37(c).
In addition there are several established common law exceptions providing for a
shift in fees including divorce actions, certain admirality cases, and cases containing con-
tractual allowances. See McCormick, supra note 14. See Plater & King, supra note 11, at
38 & n.58.
21. Fleishmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
22. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 96 (N.D. Cal. 1972). It should be emphasized
that until recently the courts have used their equitable powers sparingly with the first
two categories of exception accounting for the majority of instances.
23. The obdurate conduct rule was the most readily accepted equitable exception by
American courts because of its long standing in the practices of the English Chancery. It
has been suggested that the obdurate behavior exception conditioned the courts to a higher
level of social consciousness and prepared the way for the development of the common fund
approach and the private attorney general theory. See Plater & King, supra note 11, at 43.
However, use of this theory is severely restricted by the inherent limitations of its form.
See generally Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th
Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930). Note, Use of Taxable Costs to R6gu-
late the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 78 (1953) ; 6 J. MooRE, supra note 12, at
1709.
24. Prior to 1970 the fund theory required that benefits to shareholders be capable of
monetary valuation. Following Mills v. Electric Auto-Light Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) share-
holders were deemed to have received a "substantial benefit" from the mere legal thera-
putics of a vindicated statutory policy. That is, the members' interests were protected and
the danger to their rights corrected through plaintiffs enforcement of the statute. Thus
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The third equitable departure from the American no-fee rule
came as a result of the judicial efforts to expand the required
limitations of the common fund theory. 25 In searching for a more
direct justification for shifting fees, the Supreme Court created an
unprecedented exception26 in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises: 2
A Title II suit is thus private in form-only. When a plain-
tiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover dam-
ages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself
alone but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating
a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their
own attorney's fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a po-
sition to advance the public interest by invoking the injunc-
tive powers of the federal courts.2 8
The private attorney general approach offered a persuasive alterna-
tive because of its consideration of broad public policies.2
Recognizing the need to encourage private action to enforce
strong legislative policy, equity courts have granted fees in other
civil casess0 brought under earlier -statutes that are silent on the
question of awarding such expenses.31 However, this need cannot
adequately be met under existing theories of expense awards. Recent
decisions on federal class action have made it a limited basis for
fee recovery.3 2 Application of the qui tam reward system is limited
fees may be awarded although no pecuniary benefit arises, provided a nexus can be estab-
lished between the members of the subclass of shareholders and the subject matter. see
Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L.
REv. 658, 662-63 (1956); Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Envtron-
m6ntal Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1937). The non-monetary benefits of
enforced Congressional policies have been widely recognized as a basis for awarding fees
to other classes Including labor unions, organization members, and recently large, almost
unidentifiable groups such as students, ethnic minorities and taxpayers. See Yablonski v.
United Mine Workers of America, 466 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct.
2729 (1973) ; Hall v. Cole, 93 S. Ct. 1943 (1973) ; LaRaza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
25. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 896 U.S. 375, 392-394 (1970).
26. Actually the private attorney general concept -had been applied in various suits
against the government as a basis for standing to sue. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). See Plater & King, supra
note 11, at 50 and n.123.
27. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
28. Id. at 401-02.
29. Thus the requirement that the benefits arise from the enforcement of statutory regu-
lations was expanded to include benefits created from the support of broad public policies.
See, e.g., Brewer v. School Board, 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933
(1972) ; Wyatt v. Strickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). See also Note, Awarding
Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litiga-
tion in the Public Interest, 24 HAST. L. J. 733, 751-52 (1973).
30. See, e.g., Jones v. Mayer Co., 892 U.S. 409 (1968); Lee v. Southern Home Sites
Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Bradley v. School Board, 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va.
1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972) ; Brewer v. School Board, 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.
'1972) ; Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Fla. 1972) ; NAACP v. Allen, 840 F. Supp.
703 (M.D. Ala. 1972) ; Wyatt v. Strickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
31. See discussion note 25, supra.
32. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). Subsequent cases have held that each member
of the class in a diversity action must meet the requisite federal jurisdictional amount of
$10,000. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) ; Zahn v. International Paper Company, 469 F.2d
1033 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Potrero Hill Community Action Comm. v. Housing Authority, 410 F.2d
974 (9th Cir. 1969).
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by statute to a small number of cases. 33 Consequently, the private
attorney general rationale seems to provide the most useful fee
recovery theory because it avoids the indirection and practical lim-
itations of the other approaches and yet encourages private enforce-
ment of public policy.
The private attorney general principle in many ways is still
a compendious- concept rather than a fixed rule of recovery. But
several criteria and equitable guidelines were recently established
for applying the theory.3 The court in La Raza Unida v. Volpe"5
stated that:
The rule . . . is that whenever there is nothing in a stat-
utory scheme which might be interpreted as precluding it,
a "private attorney general" should be awarded attorney's
fees when he has effectuated a strong Congressional policy
which has benefited a large class of people, and where further
the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement
are such as to make the award essential.
3 6
Thus, the court recognized four requirements-public policy, public
benefit, necessity of private enforcement, and the financial burden
of that enforcement.
Although it may be suggested that enforcement of any law satis-
fies the first requirement by serving public policy, the courts have
intimated that some laws present a more compelling case than
others.3 7 Since it has become apparent in the last few years that
environmental protection is a high-ranking public priority,38 fee shift-
ing is considered more justifiable. The method generally used for
establishing the existence of such priorities has been to, first, con-
33. A party files a claim in such cases to recover a penalty against a violator of a statute
which provides that the penalty shall be shared by any informer bringing suit. See Plater
& King, supra note 11, at 50 & n.123.
34. Before the La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) decision, how-
ever, the private attorney general principle had been applied primarily to standing questions
in environmental cases, e.g., Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d
97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970) ; Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence v. Federal Power Com'n., 354 F.2d 608" (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
(1966) ; Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970).
35. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). This was the first case in which a federal court
applied the private attorney general exception to an environmental action. Plaintiffs con-
tended that the state and federal governments had failed to comply with federal building
regulations and thereby obtained a preliminary injunction. The La Raza Court ruled that
even though the regulations did not provide for such expenses petitioners were entitled to
an award of fees from the state defendant under the private attorney general exception.
86. Id. at 98.
37. See Plater & King, supra note 11, at 65.
38. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In La Raza the court stated
that actions to save the environment are "[elveryone's business . . .", and that "[almost
all of society is better off when public policies in these areas have beent strengthened." 1d.1
at 100. NEPA supports the court on this Issue. Section 101(c) of NEPA states "Congress
recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person
has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment."
42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970). See Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E=me2:
Environment Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CoRNELL L. REV. 674
(1970). The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 states that "[e]ach person should
enjoy a healthful environment." (§ 101 (c), 43 U.S.C. § 4331(c) 1970).
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sider the statutes relevant to the controversy,39 and then to assess
the interests being vindicated to determine if the litigation will
serve to uphold a strong congressional policy and thereby justify
financing the prevailing party's efforts.
40
While the policy requirement demands that a vital public inter-
est be involved, the benefit element requires that the litigation sig-
nificantly serve that public interest. This means that the litigation
must be of importance to the vital public interest involved, irres-
pective of the effects on the individual litigants.41 The sufficiency
of the benefit ultimately depends upon whether the cause of action
raises questions that are common to other similar cases, or whether
any decision would be limited to the facts of the instant case.
4 2
The necessity requirement is generally satisfied43 by the court's
recognition of the inherent value in private policing of public offi-
cials and agencies who often are either incapable of executing,
or ignore, their duties to protect the public.4 4 In some cases private
attorneys general may not be able to recover their expenses until
they have demonstrated that no governmental agent would have
prosecuted the violation. 45
Finally, the purpose of the financial burden requirement is to
determine whether the parties acting as private attorneys general
would be unable to bring similar actions in the future if they did
not recover their fee expenses. 4r This requirement discourages fee
shifting in cases litigating public issues as an attempt to prosper
financially. 47 However, the financial burden of instituting such suits
39. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Cf. Citizens Com-
mission for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
40. The policy need not be the same policy contained in the law underlying the action.
See Plater & King, supra note 11, at 66. Courts, however, refuse to award fees where the
environmental concern is not a part of the real cause of action but is raised only to support
an argument for recovering expenses.
41. Although precise calculation of the class membership that Is benefited is not required,
proof of effectuation of a strong public policy is required. See Plater & King, supra note
11, at 67-69.
42. In general terms, the courts in environmental cases seem to require only that the
benefits be widespread or result in a significant implementation of national policy.
43. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99-100 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Note, Right to
Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. Rxv. 27, 69-71
(1973).
44. The La Raza court stated such needs occur where, "[t]he only public entities that
might have brought suit . . . are named as defendants . . . and vigorously oppose plain-
tiffs' contentions . . . only private citizens can be expected to guard the guardians." 57
F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Moreover Congress has recently begun inserting citizens
suit provisions in statutes. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
93 U.S.C.A. § 1365(d), (Supp. 1974) ; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1857(h)-2(d) (e) (Supp. 1973); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4911(d) (Supp. 1973).
45. Some statutes provide for an award of fees only upon proof that officials are not
"diligently prosecuting" violations. E.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 304(b)
(1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h)-2(b) (1) (B) (1970). See Plater & King, supra note 11, at 71.
46. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375 (1970) ; Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1
(1973); Dee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). See Plater &
King, supra note 11, at 72.
47. Fee awards are dependent on the facts of each case. In Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp.
683, 686 (D. Minn. 1917) the plaintiff's counsel presented an affidavit estimating his total
attorneys fees at $11,280. The court, however, allowed the plaintiff's attorney only $1,000
for his counsel fees.
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usually prevents even the legitimate public interest cases.48 Conse-
quently, the courts are inclined to support private attorney general
suits through fee shifting when it appears that the litigants have
no financial incentive for bringing such actions. 9
It must be re-emphasized that these requirements are variable
elements supporting an award of fees rather than fixed criteria
of an established rule.5 0 Comparing the requirements of the common
fund concept with those of the private attorney general theory re-
veals the greater utility of the latter." The main differences lie
in the classes benefited and in the defendants taxed. In environ-
mental actions the common fund exception provides a workable
rationale for fee taxing with public defendants, but becomes useless
for private defendants because the public cannot be justly taxed
for the benefit accrued.52 The private attorney general theory, how-
ever, does not differentiate between private and public defendants.
And thus, because equity supports those who protect the public's
interests, the defendant simply pays the plaintiff's expenses. 53 But
the private attorney general exception, like the others, is subject
to the defense of sovereign immunity.
5 '
In Wilderness Society v. Morton, the court awarded attorney's
fees under the private attorney general exception, holding that both
the obdurate behavior and the common fund exceptions were not
applicable because of plaintiff's good faith and the inability to spread
costs among the beneficiaries. Following the general guildeines set
forth in La Raza,55 the court made several minor refinements.
The court went further by recognizing that petitioners' legal efforts
to improve the environment followed the express Congressional
policy contained both in NEPA and the Mineral Leasing Act of
48. A significant example can be found in the case history of section 102 of NEPA 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (1973). Only about 30% of the impact statements filed under this provision
are ever contested. For an excellent discussion of this see Plater & King, supra note 11, at
72-73.
49. Most environmental litigation depends on large privately and foundation supported
groups such as the Sierra Club and the National Resource Defense Council. And it is a
paramount principle of equity that courts will go much further to grant and withhold relief
in the furtherance of a public interest. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300
U.S. 515 (1937) ; Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
50. See Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 850 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W.
2160 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1974).
51. See Plater & King, supra note 11, at 52-3.
52. See, Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation,
58 CoaNLLL L. Rnv. 1222, 1245-46 (1973).
53. Id. at 1246.
54. State and federal governments are immune from actions at law or equity and can
only be attacked through their individual officers or agents. If an official is sued under
this fiction as an individual, he is held to be responsible for his actions as a private per-
son, independent of his official capacity. Thus a state employee may be liable for attorney
and expert witness fees if sued in his individual capacity. However, this fiction does not
apply to federal officials who may only be sued for ordinary costs. 28 U.S.C. § 2413 (1970).
See, Note, supra note 56 at 1246-53; Plater & King, supra note 11, at 85-91; Davis, Admin-
istrative Law Text, § 26.06 (3d ed. 1972).
55. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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1920 for protecting the public interest.5 6 Even though petitioners
did not obtain the ultimate relief sought,5 7 the court reasoned that
their efforts provided a valuable public service through the legis-
lative changes they caused.58 Considering the legislative changes
that took place, this case would seem to offer a good example
of legal therapeutics.5 9 Previously, fee awards have been limited
to the benefits arising from enforcement of existing laws. In Wilder-
ness, however, recovery was granted for the public benefits derived
from laws passed as a result of the litigation.
The most far reaching aspect of this decision to award attorney's
fees was the method selected for assessing those fees. The court
was unable to assess fees to the real violator, the government,
because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Having only one
possible source of payment left, the court suggested that fee shifting
under the private attorney general exception is not for purposes
of punishing the violators, but rather to compensate those who have
acted to insure enforcement of the law.60 As a result, even though
Alyeska had committed no actual violation, it was held liable for
one half the fees awarded because of its involvement in the litigation
and its status as a major and real party in interest. As such,
it would appear that the social utility of the appellant's efforts
presented overriding considerations favoring their recovery, and thus
required an extension of defendants' duty to pay.
The award of attorney fees was recently rejected in Sierra
Club v. Lynn. 1 The Wilderness case, however, may be distinguished
from that decision, in that petitioners sought not only to enforce
important Congressional policy but also served as a catalyst to
effect Congressional passage of remedial legislation. Using this dis-
tinction of whether the litigation causes corrective legislation is
impractical because such a response by Congress occurs too rarely
to make it a useful criteria. Thus, the Supreme Court may ultimately
have to resolve the issue of whether the benefits to society are
important enough to merit recovery from private parties who, al-
though innocent, have benefitted from the government's violation.
Finally, in conjunction with assessment, the Wilderness court
56. See notes 1-4 supra.
57. See note 40 supra; Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 840-44 (W.D. Tex. 1978),
rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 2160 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1974).
58. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1034 (D.C. Mr. 1974).
59. Id. at 1033.
60. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ; Justice Mackin-
non, dissenting, severely criticized the court for this reasoning. Id. at 1041.
61. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 2160
(5th Cir. Oct. 4, 1974). A request for an award of attorney's fees against a private de-
veloper in an action to protect the public interests under NEPA was denied. The court
refused to follow Wilderness, reasoning that Congress directed NEPA environmental obli-
gations against federal agencies alone. And the fact that the breach was committed by a
federal agency immune from liability for financial redress afforded no basis for shifting
fees to the private developer.
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RECENT CASES
held that the amount of the award should be fixed by the district
court, 2 which will allow for appeals, and that the amount in environ-
mental cases involving the private attorney general exception should
represent the reasonable value of the services rendered. 68 It was
also determined that the award should go to the counsel who worked
on the case, despite the absence of any obligation on the part
of the parties to pay the fee.64 Attorneys are required to repay
their clients for the expenses normally included in the fee, such
as legal stenographers, adjunct staffs, and supplies, but any excess
belongs to consel themselves.6 5
The recent cases awarding attorneys' fees indicate that the Amer-
ican no-fee rule is undergoing change.6 6 The emergence of the pri-
vate attorney general exception to the traditional rule provides a
vehicle through which private citizens may now overcome the fi-
nancial barriers that have previously prevented actions designed
to protect broad public interests. Perhaps it is just another political
paradox of the times that government agencies frequently arguing
against the proliferation of citizen enforcement actions are at the
same time complaining that they lack the man power needed to
prosecute such violations. Hopefully, this rising remedy, as outlined
in Wilderness, will be uniformly adopted in time to save the vital
public interests threatened with extinction for lack of an adequate
means of defense.
DEAN HoIsTAD
62. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 399 U.S. 222 (1970) ; United Pacific In-
surance Co. v. Idaho First National Bank, 378 F.2d 62, 69 (9th Cir. 1967); Wilderness
Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
63. Angoff v. Gotfine, 270 F.2d 185, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1955) ; Wilderness Society v. Mor-
ton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
64. "Litigation of this sort should not have to rely on the charity of parties volunteering
to serve as private attorneys general. The attorney who worked on this case should be re-
imbursed the reasonable value of their services, despite the absence of any obligation on
the part of appellants to pay attorneys' fees." Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026,
1037 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
65. This avoids the problem of being accused of an unauthorized practice of law and
still provides a way of paying expenses with counsel becoming a sort of cashier for the
fees awarded to plaintiff in his action. Id. at 1037.
66. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) ; Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364
F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973) ; Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Wilderness
Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

